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1505 
TICK TOCK:  WHEN DOES THE THIRTY-DAY 
CLOCK IN RULE 4003(B) BEGIN? 
MAEGHAN J. MCLOUGHLIN† 
INTRODUCTION 
An individual debtor files for bankruptcy.  The debtor then 
files a list of his assets that he claims as exempt from the estate.  
The exempted assets will be protected from liquidation; the non-
exempt assets will be converted into cash and distributed to 
creditors.  The requisite meeting of creditors is held to determine 
if the claimed exemptions are proper under the applicable 
statutory provisions.  No conclusion is reached.  The presiding 
trustee1 adjourns the meeting to an unspecified future date.  
Subsequently, the debtor crashes his car, an asset he claimed as 
exempt.  Who owns the car?  Who suffers the loss?  
Exemptions play a vital role in chapter 7 consumer 
bankruptcies because the exempted assets serve as the bedrock 
for the debtor’s new life after discharge from bankruptcy.  The 
debtor’s goal of maximizing exemptions to facilitate the post-
bankruptcy “fresh start”2 is rivaled by the creditor’s objective of 
maximizing the estate for a larger recovery in the pro rata asset 
distribution.3  The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) and Federal Rules 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Fairfield University. I would like to thank 
Professor Keith Sharfman for his help and guidance and my father, Patrick 
McLoughlin, for his inspiration and wisdom, my mother, Paula McLoughlin, for 
always believing in me, and my sister, Molly McLoughlin, for her spirit. 
1 In most instances, the meeting is presided over by the United States trustee, 
who then delegates that task to the trustee handling the case if the creditors wish to 
elect a trustee. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 341.02[4] (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
2 The “fresh start” is a creature of congressional policy that enables the honest 
but unfortunate debtor a new opportunity in life, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of pre-existing debt. See In re Ramlow, 417 B.R. 479, 481 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 2009); Cano v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. (In re Cano), 410 B.R. 506, 535 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). 
3 See Boyd v. Engman, 404 B.R. 467, 480 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (stating that the 
goal of bankruptcy process is to obtain a maximum equitable distribution for 
creditors and to ensure a fresh start for individual debtors); In re Cross, 255 B.R. 25, 
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of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Rules”) strike a balance in this 
perennial conflict by requiring the debtor to file a list of claimed 
exemptions and providing the trustee and creditors the 
opportunity to object within a set time.4  However, attempts to 
efficiently resolve cases and restore equilibrium between debtors 
and creditors have been endangered by a practice that both 
manipulates and undermines the deadlines set out in the Code 
and Rules.   
Section 522(l) of the Code and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 4003(b) govern the process through which a debtor 
claims exemptions and parties in interest, namely the trustee 
and creditors, may object to the claimed objections.5  Section 
522(l) requires the debtor to file a list of property claimed as 
exempt and states that if no objection is timely filed, “the 
property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.”6  Rule 
4003(b) establishes the deadline for objections, providing that “a 
party in interest may file an objection to the list of property 
claimed as exempt within 30 days after the meeting of creditors 
held under § 341(a) is concluded.”7  The § 341 meeting of 
creditors8 is held to bring the debtor’s financial affairs to light 
and allows the trustee and creditors to assess the validity of the 
claimed exemptions.9  The creditor’s meeting cannot always be 
completed at one time, however; accordingly, trustees have 
adopted the practice of adjourning the meeting indefinitely, 
thereby preventing the thirty-day deadline for objections from 
 
32 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000) (pointing out that bankruptcy law simultaneously 
pursues two contradictory goals: it seeks to provide a distribution to creditors by 
liquidating debtor’s property, but at the same time, it also seeks to give debtor a 
“fresh start” through the bankruptcy discharge and by allowing debtor to keep 
property from creditors through exemptions); In re Campbell, 124 B.R. 462, 464 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (explaining that the basic objective of bankruptcy law is two-
fold: to achieve just and equitable distribution of assets to creditors and to relieve 
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, thereby giving debtor a “fresh 
start”). 
4 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(l) (West 2011); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1). 
5 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(l); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(a)–(b). 
6 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(l). 
7 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1). The Rule further provides that the “court may, 
for cause, extend the time for filing objections if, before the time to object expires, a 
party in interest files a request for an extension.” Id. 
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 341(a). This meeting is colloquially called “the section 341 
meeting” or “the 341 meeting of creditors.” See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra 
note 1, ¶ 341.02[5][c]; see also, e.g., In re Campbell, 124 B.R. at 464.  
9 See 11 U.S.C. § 341; see also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, 
¶ 341.02[5][d]. 
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ever starting.10  These indefinite adjournments have exacerbated 
uncertainty over claimed exemptions and have thwarted the 
shared goal of expeditious administration of cases. 
Trustees are empowered, pursuant to Rule 2003(e), to 
adjourn the meeting “from time to time by announcement at the 
meeting of the adjourned date and time without further written 
notice.”11  Several courts have interpreted Rule 2003(e) to permit 
open-ended adjournments without announcement of the 
adjourned date and time.12  Courts have also allowed the trustee 
to end meetings without concluding or adjourning them; thus 
leaving the question of whether the thirty-day deadline began a 
mystery.  These practices increase delay, prevent an expeditious 
resolution, and render the thirty-day deadline in Rule 4003(b) 
meaningless—a result the Court and Congress could not have 
intended when promulgating and enacting the Rules.   
A circuit split has emerged on the issue of when the creditors 
meeting is deemed concluded for purposes of starting the thirty-
day clock if no formal announcement of a continuation date is 
made at the meeting.13  The Ninth Circuit adheres to the “bright 
line” approach, requiring the trustee to announce a specific date 
and time for the new 341 meeting of creditors within thirty days 
of the last meeting.14  If the trustee fails to do so, the meeting is 
deemed concluded.15  In contrast, the Fifth Circuit employs the 
“case-by-case” approach, which considers the facts of each case to 
determine whether a 341 meeting of creditors was either 
adjourned or concluded.16  The conflicting approaches result in 
the debtor’s uncertainty regarding post-bankruptcy retention of 
property and creditors’ confusion over the timeframe to object in 
hopes of maximizing the estate. 
This Note surveys the competing approaches to the thirty-
day limitation and its impact on the rights of both debtors and 
creditors.  It concludes with a proposed solution derived from the 
 
10 See, e.g., Peres v. Sherman (In re Peres), 530 F.3d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2008). 
11 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e). 
12 See, e.g., In re Flynn, 200 B.R. 481, 483 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). 
13 Prior to this circuit split, the Supreme Court strictly construed the thirty-day 
deadline, barring all belated challenges to the claimed exemptions, regardless of the 
validity of the exemptions. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643–44 
(1992). 
14 See Smith v. Kennedy (In re Smith), 235 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 2000).   
15 Id. 
16 See Peres v. Sherman (In re Peres), 530 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008). 
CP_McLoughlin (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:13 PM 
1508 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1505   
bright line approach but extends further to encompass the 
policies inherent in the Code.  Part I provides a background of 
chapter 7 bankruptcy cases and the applicable Code and Rule 
provisions that facilitate the estate administration.  Part II 
reviews the conflicting case law and differing interpretations 
regarding the conclusion of the 341 meeting of creditors.  Part III 
examines the policies, interpretations, and equitable 
considerations underlying Rule 4003(b).  Part III then proposes 
that Rule 4003(b) be revised to provide that unless the trustee, 
for cause, announces the future date and time of the adjourned 
meeting at the 341 meeting of creditors, the thirty-day period 
begins as of the last date of the creditors meeting.  Part III 
concludes by detailing the practical concerns associated with 
indefinite adjournments and demonstrates that the proposed 
solution accords with the values animating the Code and Rules.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Historical Treatment of Rule 4003(b) and Its Predecessors  
The history of exemptions in bankruptcy law has developed 
to ensure that the debtor receives a prompt, efficient, and 
comprehensive determination of any exemption dispute.  The 
first two federal bankruptcy statutes, the Acts of 180017 and 
1841,18 allowed debtors a modest set of exemptions, such as 
necessary furniture and wearing apparel.  The third federal 
bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, added to 
exemption laws by promulgating procedural rules requiring the 
trustee to report to the court within twenty days of receiving the 
debtor’s list of exemptions.19  The 1867 Act established the two 
enduring themes of requiring the trustee to determine the 
debtor’s exemptions within a short period of time and requiring 
objections to be promptly submitted to the court for resolution. 
General Order 17,20 promulgated under the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898,21 tightened the deadlines governing the trustee’s 
 
17 Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 5, 2 Stat. 19, 23 (repealed 1803). 
18 Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed 1843). 
19 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 11, 14 Stat. 517, 523 (repealed 1878). 
20 General Orders in Bankruptcy 17(2) (1898), reprinted in 4B COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY 1534 (James Wm. Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th ed. 1978). 
21 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 11 U.S.C. § 24, amended by 
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d), 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978). 
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determination, valuation, and distribution to the debtor of the 
exempt property, giving the trustee five days to make a report to 
the court.22  Former Rule 403, the predecessor to the current Rule 
4003, superseded General Order 17 and allowed the trustee 
fifteen days to object to the debtor’s report of exemptions.23  If no 
objections were filed within fifteen days, the report was deemed 
approved by the court.24  Former Rule 403(e) thus introduced the 
concept of automatic allowance of exemptions and further 
expedited the process of administering estates. 
After Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, Rule 
4003 was promulgated, giving any party in interest thirty days to 
object after the meeting of creditors concluded.25  Together, Rule 
4003 and section 522 enable the debtor to create a list of 
exemptions, which is presumed valid absent objection within 
thirty days.26  The rigid deadlines present throughout history for 
filing objections serve the congressional purpose of determining, 
at an early stage in the case, a debtor’s entitlement to exempt 
property.27  Thus, the relevant history reflects a statutory scheme 
designed to ensure the speedy resolution and effective 
administration of a debtor’s exemption entitlements.   
B. Background of Exemption Policy 
A primary goal of the bankruptcy system is to secure the 
speedy and efficient administration of the estate so that assets 
can be distributed to creditors.28  The Code and Rules require an 
early and accurate list of the debtor’s claimed exemptions to aid 
the trustee in expeditiously determining the rights of both the 
 
22 General Orders in Bankruptcy 17(2) (1898). 
23 FED. R. BANKR. P. 403 (repealed 1975), reprinted in 4B COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 20, at 4-27. 
24 Id.  
25 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).  
26 11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (West 2011). 
27 See In re McCormack, 244 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000). 
28 Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, the property in which the debtor has a 
legal or equitable interest becomes property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541; Young 
v. Adler (In re Young), 806 F.2d 1303, 1305 (5th Cir. 1987). After filing, the debtor 
may try to exempt certain property from the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(l). 
Exempt property is no longer property of the bankruptcy estate. See Taylor v. 
Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 642 (1992); see also Superintendent of Ins. for the 
State of N.Y. v. Ochs (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 377 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Beaty v. Selinger (In re Beaty), 306 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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debtor and creditors.29  This goal of prompt estate administration 
is paired with that of giving the debtor a fresh start, which 
allows the debtor to retain certain assets fundamental to 
becoming a productive member of society once again.30  Other 
than the assets approved as exempt pursuant to § 522(l), all of 
the debtor’s interests in property are transferred to the trustee 
for distribution among the creditors.31  Typically, exemption 
disputes arise from debtors’ erroneous valuation of an item or 
debtors claiming as exempt an amount higher than the relevant 
law permits.32  Without a properly-timed objection under Rule 
4003(b), the excess value over the legal exemption amount 
remains property of the debtor,33 despite the claimed exemption’s 
lack of merit.34   
C. Structure and Purpose of the Individual Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy 
Allowing trustees an open-ended time period to determine 
whether the exemptions are objectionable is contrary to the 
structure and purpose of the most common consumer 
bankruptcy, the chapter 7 liquidation.35  In 2007, consumer 
 
29 See In re Starns, 52 B.R. 405, 410 (S.D. Tex. 1985) (stating that the purpose of 
§ 522(l) and Rule 4003(b) “is to protect the rights of a debtor by requiring a prompt 
determination of the right to exemptions”). 
30 See COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 13.08[1] (Alan N. 
Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 12A ed. 2009). This is frequently referred to as 
relieving the “honest but unfortunate debtor” from the oppression of indebtedness. 
See Starr v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 193 B.R. 195, 200 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting 
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)). 
31 COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 30. However, 
the trustee can elect to abandon certain property if he or she determines that they 
have no value to the estate. Id. 
32 Id. ¶ 13.08[3][a]. 
33 See id. ¶ 13.08. 
34 See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 633–34 (1992) (holding that a 
trustee may not contest the validity of a claimed exemption under § 522 after Rule 
4003(b)’s thirty-day period has expired, even though the debtor had no colorable 
basis for claiming exemption); see also In re Kazi, 985 F.2d 318, 320 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(stating that Rule 4003(b) acts as an absolute bar to hearing objections, whatever 
the underlying merits of debtors’ exemptions and debtors’ actual knowledge of 
opposition to exemptions may be); In re Ferretti, 203 B.R. 796, 799 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1996) (finding that an automobile accident claim was exempt, although Florida law 
did not provide for exemption for accident claims, where trustee and creditors failed 
to object within the thirty-day limit). 
35 See Richard M. Hynes, Credit Markets, Exemptions, and Households with 
Nothing To Exempt, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 493, 500 (2006) (stating that about 
seventy percent of bankrupt consumers choose chapter 7). 
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chapter 7 bankruptcies lasted an average of just 124 days.36  Rule 
4003(b)’s thirty-day deadline plays a vital role in the 
comprehensive and fast-paced framework enacted by Congress by 
promoting the expeditious resolution of consumer cases.37  
Accordingly, adhering to a short deadline comports with the 
statutory design for individual cases because the need for 
certainty regarding exempted assets is at its zenith.38  Certainty 
is vitally important in chapter 7 liquidations, as opposed to 
chapter 13 reorganizations, because the non-exempt assets will 
be turned over to the trustee, sold, and the proceeds will be 
distributed to creditors.39  When the thirty-day deadline never 
begins, debtors may be hesitant to use the questionably exempt 
property because they are unsure if they even own it.  A more 
troubling issue arises when the debtor does use the debatably 
exempt property and impairs its value while waiting for the 
trustee to declare a new meeting.  In this scenario, the debtor has 
potentially interfered with the estate and distribution, but due to 
the delay, neither party knows who will suffer the loss.   
Section 522 governs the process for claiming exemptions 
when filing for bankruptcy.40  “The substantive purpose of 
 
36 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 REPORT OF STATISTICS 
REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT OF 2005 STATISTICS tbl.3 (2008), available at  http://www.uscourts. 
gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/2007/Table3.pdf; see also 
Discharge in Bankruptcy, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/discharge.html#when (last visited Feb. 11, 
2011) (stating on the Federal Judiciary’s “Bankruptcy Basics” that “typically, [a 
chapter 7 discharge is granted] about four months after the date the debtor files the 
petition”). 
37 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006); id. § 365(d); 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(a)(2)(A) 
(West 2011); id. § 704(b)(1)(A); id. § 704(b)(2); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 2015(a)(1), 
2003(a), 2003(e), 3002, 4004, 4007(b)–(c). 
38 See 1 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE ch. 3.1 (John Rao & Henry 
J. Sommer eds., 9th ed. 2009). The congressional imperatives are designed to move 
cases along quickly because chapter 7 filings are by far the most frequently used 
type of bankruptcy case commenced by individual debtors. 
39 See In re Graham, 258 B.R. 286, 290 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (noting that 
exemptions serve a very different purpose in chapter 7 as opposed to chapter 13 
because protection of assets against a forced sale is not relevant in a chapter 13 
proceeding).  
40 11 U.S.C.A. § 522; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 522.01 (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). Section 522(d) lists categories of property in 
varying amounts that a debtor may claim as exempt. Section 522(b) provides that 
some states can prohibit their citizens from using the exemptions in § 522(d). This is 
known as “opt[ing] out,” and the individual states then provide the list of exemptions 
available to their citizens under applicable state law. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(b). 
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personal exemptions in bankruptcy is to ensure that individual 
debtors will not emerge from bankruptcy completely destitute” 
but rather will retain certain basic assets needed both for daily 
living and a quick reentry into normal economic life.41  “Without 
this kind of protection, the ‘fresh start’ that is a debtor’s primary 
goal in consumer bankruptcy would, in most cases, merely be a 
fresh path to new debt.”42  Section 522 specifies certain property 
that the debtor is entitled to exempt and provides the monetary 
caps for such exemptions.43  Section 522(l) grants debtors 
property rights in the claimed exemptions by succinctly stating 
that in the absence of an objection, the list of claimed exemptions 
is exempt.44  The Code defers to the Rules with regard to the 
timing and procedure for objecting to claims.45 
The 341 meeting of creditors is the means for evaluating the 
validity of the debtor’s claimed exemptions.46  In a chapter 7 
filing, the trustee must convene the meeting between twenty and 
forty days after the debtor files for bankruptcy.47  The purpose of 
the meeting is to obtain information beyond what was listed in 
the debtor’s schedules, specifically, the assets and liabilities that 
exist.48  At the meeting, the trustee and creditors may question 
the debtor regarding transactions involving the debtor, the 
debtor’s financial state, or any other issue that could affect the 
administration and settlement of the estate.49  To bring to light 
any possible objections, creditors are entitled to inquire about 
 
41 In re Long, 260 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001) (citation omitted). 
42 Id. at 861–62 (citation omitted). 
43 11 U.S.C.A. § 522. 
44 Id. § 522(l). 
45 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 40, ¶ 522.05[2]. 
46 See COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 30, 
¶ 16.06. Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to attend the 
meeting. Id. The Rules also require the individual debtor to attend the meeting in 
person and submit to examination by the creditors. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(b)(1). 
47 Id. 2003(a). In a chapter 7 or 11 proceeding, the meeting is to be convened 
between twenty-one and forty days after the order for relief. Chapter 13 creditors 
meetings are scheduled between twenty-one and fifty days after the order for relief. 
Id.; see also 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 2003.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 15th rev. ed. 2010).  
48 See COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 30, 
¶ 16.03. 
49 See id. ¶ 16.01. The questions typically asked, as well as other guidelines for 
§ 341(a) meetings and administration of chapter 7 cases, can be found in U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEES 2-1 to 2-4 (2002) [hereinafter 
TRUSTEE HANDBOOK], available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/ 
library/chapter07/docs/7handbook0301/Ch7hb0702.pdf. 
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concealed assets, fraudulent transfers, or grounds for 
dischargeability.50  These inquiries should asses the accuracy of 
the schedules containing exemptions and determine whether the 
filing is an abuse of the system.51  If suspicion arises at the 
meeting of creditors, the creditors may: (1) ask the trustee to 
adjourn the meeting by announcing a new adjourned date in the 
future or52 (2) file a request for an extension of time within thirty 
days of the 341 meeting of creditors if cause exists.53  Because a 
creditor can acquire the necessary financial information by other 
means, such as a court-ordered examination of the debtor,54 a 
maneuver to create delay “by continuing the meeting of creditors 
would be unjustified and abusive.”55   
Rule 4003(b) provides the method for objecting to exemptions 
not allowed under § 522 and discovered in the 341 creditors 
meeting.56  The primary purpose of Rule 4003(b) is to ensure that 
exemption disputes are resolved early and quickly in bankruptcy 
proceedings.57  The Rule provides that  
a party in interest may file an objection to the list of property 
claimed as exempt within 30 days after the meeting of creditors 
held under § 341(a) is concluded . . . .  The court may, for cause, 
extend the time for filing objections if, before the time to object 




50 See COLLIER CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 30, 
¶ 16.06[3]. In the typical consumer debtor case, creditors rarely come to the § 341 
meeting because these debtors rarely have any assets of significant value. Id. 
¶ 16.06[3]. 
51 Id. ¶ 16.03. 
52 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e). 
53 Id. 4003(b)(1). 
54 The trustee has the additional option of requesting a Rule 2004 examination. 
See id. 2004. Rule 2004(a) states that “[o]n motion of any party in interest, the court 
may order the examination of any entity.” Id. An examination under Rule 2004 
allows a creditor great latitude to examine the debtor about almost any issue 
pertaining to the debtor’s case. See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47, 
¶ 2003.02[2][c]. 
55 In re Vance, 120 B.R. 181, 197 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990). 
56 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
57 See In re McCormack, 244 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000) (noting that a 
rigid deadline for objecting to a debtor’s claimed exemptions serves the congressional 
purpose of determining a debtor’s entitlement to exempt property at an early stage 
of a bankruptcy case).   
58 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
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The thirty-day deadline incentivizes prompt action by the 
trustee and creditors to quickly resolve any disputes over the 
debtor’s listed exemptions.59  Thus, Rule 4003(b) “reflects a 
[c]ongressional attempt to strike a proper balance between 
providing trustees and creditors with an opportunity to object to 
any exemptions they feel are contrary to their interests, while at 
the same time assuring the debtor of some sense of finality.”60  
Another vital purpose of the thirty-day limit is to provide the 
debtor with early notice of an objection and determine whether 
the listed exemption must instead be turned over to the trustee 
and liquidated.61 
In addition, Rule 2003(e) provides the method for adjourning 
the 341 meeting of creditors when it could not be concluded in the 
initial session.  Specifically, the Rule states that “[t]he meeting 
may be adjourned from time to time by announcement at the 
meeting of the adjourned date and time without further written 
notice.”62  The trustee may have various reasons for not 
concluding a meeting in one session, such as a complex estate, 
mistaken exemptions, or the trustee’s desire for more 
investigative time.63  The creditors meeting, however, should only 
be adjourned if the trustee reasonably believes that the debtor’s 
financial affairs and accuracy of the listed exemptions have not 
been fully investigated.64   
 
 
59 See Stoulig v. Traina, 169 B.R. 597, 599 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1994). 
60 Id.  
61 See Spenler v. Siegel (In re Spenler), 212 B.R. 625, 630 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) 
(concluding that the purpose of Rule 4003(b) is to provide the debtor with timely 
notice that an interested party objects); In re Bush, 346 B.R. 523, 528 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wash. 2006) (dismissing the objection for being untimely when the trustee timely 
filed the objection but failed to send notice to the debtor within thirty days). 
62 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e). 
63 See Bernard v. Coyne (In re Bernard), 40 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that the thirty-day period for filing objections to debtors’ claimed 
exemptions did not begin to run on the date the creditors meeting was held where 
the meeting was continued because the § 341(a) purposes had not been fulfilled); see 
also In re Kleinman, 172 B.R. 764, 769–70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that 
the meeting of creditors is not a “one shot event” and if Rule 4003(b) intended 
objections to be filed within thirty days of the first date set for the § 341 meeting, 
rather than after the conclusion of the first meeting, it would have said so). 
64 See In re Bernard, 40 F.3d at 1031 (the trustee has the right to continue the 
creditors meeting if he or she reasonably believes that the purposes of the § 341 
meeting have not been fulfilled). 
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Neither the Code nor the Rules provide a specific manner or 
method to officially conclude the meeting of creditors.65  While it 
is settled that objections to exemptions after the thirty-day 
period has expired are prohibited,66 much confusion surrounds 
the issue of when a 341 meeting actually concludes for purposes 
of starting the Rule 4003(b) thirty-day clock.  The problem arises 
when the trustee does not announce a date and time for a future 
meeting the 341 meeting.  Recognizing that without a conclusion, 
the deadline for objections cannot begin, trustees frequently try 
to frustrate the deadline for objecting by continuing the meeting 
generally without either concluding it or continuing it to a 
definite date and time.  The theory underlying this practice is 
that there is no need to object or apply for an extension of time if 
the period to object never began.   
D. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz 
In Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,67 the Supreme Court strictly 
construed and enforced Rule 4003(b)’s thirty-day deadline, 
explicitly endorsing the prompt administration of the estate.  The 
Court in Taylor did not answer the question of when the creditors 
meeting concluded68 but instead addressed the issue of whether 
the trustee could object to an inappropriate exemption after the 
thirty days had expired.69  There, the debtor listed potential 
proceeds from a lawsuit as an exempt asset with an unknown 
value.70  This listed exemption was discussed at the 341 meeting 
of creditors, but the trustee declined to object because he doubted 
the suit’s legitimacy.71  When the case later settled for $110,000, 
the trustee demanded turnover of the funds, and the debtor 
resisted because the thirty-day deadline had expired.72  Despite 
the fact that the debtor had no “colorable [statutory] basis” for 
the exemption under § 522, the Court held that the failure to 
object to the exemption in a timely fashion barred the trustee 
 
65 See In re Cherry, 341 B.R. 581, 585 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006). 
66 See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643 (1992). 
67 503 U.S. 638. 
68 The Court in Taylor does not address this issue because the initial creditors 
meeting both began and concluded in one session. See id. at 640–41. 
69 Id. at 639.  
70 Id. at 640.  
71 Id. at 640–41. 
72 Id. at 641.  
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from later challenging the validity of the claim.73  Announcing 
the significance of timeliness, the Court stated, “Deadlines may 
lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and 
they produce finality.”74 
Notwithstanding its holding that the proceeds from the 
lawsuit were exempt, the Court acknowledged that this result 
might lead to perverse incentives.  Specifically, debtors may try 
to claim property as exempt in the hopes that the trustee or 
creditors will fail to notice or object in time.75  The Court, 
however, countered this argument by pointing out the various 
remedies and penalties already in place to discourage debtors 
from scamming the bankruptcy system.76  These include the 
denial of discharge for presenting fraudulent claims,77 the 
requirement that filings “be verified or contain an unsworn 
declaration” of truthfulness under penalty of perjury,78 the 
provision for award of sanctions for signing documents not 
grounded in fact or existing case law,79 and the imposition of 
criminal penalties for fraud in bankruptcy cases.80 
By strictly interpreting the deadlines and placing the 
objecting burden on interested parties, the Court endorsed the 
policy favoring expeditious administration of bankruptcy cases 
over “equitable” considerations of asset distribution.81  Though 
the results may be harsh for creditors, the decision is actually 
consistent with the general interpretation of deadlines for taking 
action in bankruptcy.82  This interpretation resonates strongly in 
 
73 Id. at 643–44.  
74 Id. at 644. 
75 Id.; see also Lawrence Ponoroff, Procedural Exemptions and the Taylor 
Legacy, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 397, 410 (1998) (stating that “[t]he more general 
criticism of Taylor is that the precedential effect of the decision would be to allow 
debtors to claim property as exempt, whether or not so entitled, in the hopes that the 
trustee will be too busy to catch the spurious claims in time”). Ponoroff calls the 
exemptions at issue in Taylor and its progeny “procedural exemptions” that debtors 
have the power, though not necessarily the right, to create. Id. at 397 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Despite the lack of substantive entitlement, these 
exemptions arise in bankruptcy cases due to the failure of the trustee or creditors to 
object within the deadlines. Id. 
76 Taylor, 503 U.S. at 644. 
77 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(B) (2006). 
78 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008. 
79 Id. 9011(c). 
80 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). 
81 Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 398. 
82 Id. 
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consumer bankruptcy cases where the fresh start policy objective 
is of utmost importance.83  The Court, having refused to imply a 
good faith requirement on debtors for § 522(l) and Rule 4003(b) 
purposes, advances the principles of finality, expeditious 
administration, and the fresh start, rather than vague equitable 
considerations and concerns over perverse incentives.84 
The Supreme Court upheld its holding in Taylor in a recent 
decision, Schwab v. Reilly.85  There, the debtor listed “business 
equipment” on schedule B with an estimated market value of 
$10,718 and claimed “business equipment” with a value of 
$10,718 as fully exempt on schedule C.86  The debtor used 
§ 522(d)(5) and (6), claiming the full statutory maximum of the 
wildcard and tools of the trade exemptions as her business 
equipment.87  The trustee did not object because the dollar value 
the debtor assigned to her business equipment fell within the 
limits prescribed by the Code.88  When the business equipment 
was later found to have a value of $17,200, the trustee moved to 
sell the equipment and distribute the $10,718 to the debtor.89  
Relying on Taylor, the three lower courts denied the trustee’s 
motion.90  The Supreme Court, however, ruled that because the 
value of the debtor’s claimed exemptions fell within allowed 
statutory limits, the trustee was not required to object to the 
exemptions.91   
The Court maintained that it is not reducing Rule  
4003(b)’s governance because “[c]hallenges to the valuation 
of . . . ‘exemptible assets’ are not covered by Rule 4003(b) in the 
first place.”92  The Court concluded that § 522(b), as opposed to 
§ 522(l), was the operative provision.93  Most of the categories of 
property listed in § 522(b) define the property a debtor can claim 
as exempt “as the debtor’s ‘interest’—up to a specified dollar 
amount—in the assets described in the category, not as the 
 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 410–11. The holding and policy implications in Taylor are particularly 
relevant in chapter 7 liquidations. Id. at 398. 
85 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010).    
86 Id. at 2658. 
87 Id. at 2657.  
88 Id. at 2658. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 2659. 
91 Id. at 2669. 
92 Id. at 2663 n.8. 
93 Id. at 2661. 
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assets themselves.”94  By defining the exempted property as the 
debtor’s interest in the property, the Court found that the trustee 
had no duty to object to the property the debtor claimed as 
exempt—the two interests in her business equipment—because 
the stated value of each interest, and thus the “ ‘property claimed 
as exempt[ ]’ was within the limits the Code allows.”95  
Challenges to “property claimed as exempt” under the Code are 
still subject to Rule 4003(b);96 but when the Code defines that 
property as an interest with a specified dollar limit in an asset 
and the debtor accurately declares the value of the asset to be 
within Code limits, the trustee does not have a duty to object 
within thirty days.97 
The Court found that Taylor did not mandate a different 
result.  The Court distinguished Taylor because there, the debtor 
listed an amount—“$ unknown”—that was plainly not within 
Code limits, invoking the trustee’s duty to object within thirty 
days.  In a vigorous dissent joined by two justices, Justice 
Ginsburg stated that “[i]n addition to departing from the 
prevailing understanding and practice, the Court’s decision 
exposes debtors to protracted uncertainty concerning their right 
to retain exempt property, thereby impeding the ‘fresh start’ 
exemptions are designed to foster.”98 
II. CONFLICTING CASE LAW SURROUNDING RULE 4003 
As a result of this uncertainty, the issue of how long a 
trustee may adjourn a meeting of creditors and thereby keep 
open the period to object to the debtor’s claimed exemptions has 
resulted in three distinct lines of cases: (1) bright line; (2) case-
by-case; and (3) debtor’s burden.  In the absence of a clear Rule or 
section on point, each approach attempts to define what 
constitutes the “conclusion” of the meeting of creditors.99 
 
94 Id. at 2661–62 (emphasis added). 
95 Id. at 2662. 
96 Id. at 2663 n.8. 
97 Id. at 2657. 
98 Id. at 2670 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
99 See Moyer v. Dutkiewicz (In re Dutkiewicz), 408 B.R. 103, 110 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 
2009). Without stating what action is necessary to conclude a meeting, the court 
found that merely “expressing the possible need for further questioning or 
investigation does not by itself continue the meeting.” Id. 
CP_McLoughlin (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:13 PM 
2010] TICK TOCK 1519 
A. Bright Line 
The bright line approach requires the trustee to announce a 
specific date on which the meeting will be continued within thirty 
days of the last meeting held.  If the trustee does not announce 
the future date and time, the meeting will be deemed concluded 
on the last date it was convened.100  This approach considers the 
policy underlying Rule 4003(b), “which requires that a debtor’s 
exemptions become final without delay.”101  Courts applying the 
bright line approach have held that Rule 2003(e) and Rule 
4003(b) should not be commingled to thwart the expeditious 
resolution of a case by indefinitely delaying the objection period.  
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court that has adopted a 
bright line approach when facing an indefinite adjournment.102  
In In re Smith, the trustee conducted the 341 meeting of 
creditors on October 27, 1995.103  Instead of concluding the 
meeting, the trustee adjourned the meeting until further 
notice.104  No further notice was ever given, and eight months 
later, the creditors objected to the debtor’s exemptions.105  The 
Smith Court explicitly rejected the creditors’ argument that Rule 
2003(e) permits a trustee to indefinitely continue a meeting of 
creditors.106  Applying a plain meaning approach, the court found 
that for the adjournment to be effective, it must be accompanied  
 
by an announcement of “the adjourned date and time.”107  The 
 
100 See Smith v. Kennedy (In re Smith), 235 F.3d 472, 476–77 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Clark (In re Clark), 262 B.R. 508, 515 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001); 
Moldo v. Blethen (In re Blethen), 259 B.R. 153, 158 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001); In re 
Friedlander, 284 B.R. 525, 527 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002); In re Hurdle, 240 B.R. 617, 
622 (Bankr. D. Cal. 1999); In re Levitt, 137 B.R. 881, 883 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992). 
101 See In re Cherry, 341 B.R. 581, 585 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).   
102 The Ninth Circuit first articulated this method in 1994 in Bernard v. Coyne 
(In re Bernard), 40 F.3d 1028, 1031 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The objection 
period . . . remains open until 30 days after . . . the trustee concludes a 341(a) 
meeting without expressly continuing it to a later date . . . .” (citing FED. R. BANKR. 
P. 2003(e))). The trustee, however, can only use his or her broad discretion to keep 
the § 341(a) meeting open as long as there are legitimate grounds for believing that 
further investigation will prove fruitful. Id. 
103 235 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 2000).   
104 Id. at 474. The second issue in Smith is “whether conversion of the case from 
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 triggers a new period within which to file objections to 
property already excluded as exempt during the Chapter 11 proceeding.” Id. at 473. 
The court concluded that it does not. Id. 
105 Id. at 474. 
106 Id. at 475–76. 
107 Id. at 476; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e). 
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court bluntly stated that this is the exclusive method of 
adjournment permitted by Rule 2003(e).108  
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, rejected the argument that 
Rule 2003(e)’s “may be adjourned” is permissive and not 
mandatory.109  Rather, the court held that “may” refers to the 
trustee’s power to use his or her best judgment in deciding to 
adjourn meetings or not.110  The court concluded that on a plain 
reading of Rule 2003(e), for purposes of Rule 4003(b), 
adjournment, if taken under the trustees’ discretion, “must be 
accompanied ‘by announcement at the meeting of the  
adjourned date and time.’ ”111  Relying on an earlier Ninth Circuit 
decision,112 the Smith Court held that an announcement made 
after the meeting adjourns may be sufficient, but only if the 
delayed announcement is made within thirty days of the last held 
meeting.113  The court reasoned that requiring an announcement 
within thirty days of the last meeting was consistent with the 
goal of keeping the bankruptcy process moving by enforcing firm, 
explicit deadlines.114  Reiterating one of bankruptcy law’s 
primary objectives, the court stated that “[t]o authorize trustees 
to adjourn meetings indefinitely, even when it is unlikely that 
any subsequent meeting will in fact be called, would nullify the 
thirty-day requirement of Rule 4003(b), rendering the holding in 
Taylor hollow, and undermining the concerns . . . about 
promptness and finality.”115   
The Smith Court relied heavily on In re Levitt,116 which held 
that Rules 2003(e) and 4003(b) should not be combined to 
postpone indefinitely the date by which objections to exemptions 
must be filed.117  In Levitt, the trustee held the 341 meeting of 
creditors and announced the meeting would be continued 
 
108 In re Smith, 235 F.3d at 476. 
109 Id. at 476 n.2. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. (emphasis added). 
112 See Bernard v. Coyne (In re Bernard), 40 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 1994). 
113 In re Smith, 235 F.3d at 476. 
114 Id. at 478. 
115 Id. at 476. This view was reaffirmed in Moldo v. Blethen (In re Blethen), 259 
B.R. 153, 156 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) (finding that although the trustee has discretion 
to continue the meeting, general continuances render the 4003(b) deadline 
meaningless, promoting uncertainty and preventing finality). 
116 137 B.R. 881 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992). 
117 Id. at 883. 
CP_McLoughlin (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:13 PM 
2010] TICK TOCK 1521 
indefinitely because he wanted to investigate various issues.118  
The trustee then delayed fifteen months before ultimately filing 
an objection to the debtor’s exemptions.119  Analyzing the 
interplay between Rules 2003(e) and 4003(b), the court found a 
strong policy prohibiting the trustee from adjourning the meeting 
simply to delay the date by which objections must be filed.120  
Specifically, Rule 4003(b)’s thirty-day requirement exhibits the 
“rulemakers’ concern that the exemptions become final within a 
definite and relatively short time.”121  By providing the means for 
adjournment, Rule 2003(e) exhibits the legislature’s focus on 
“keep[ing] the process moving.”122  Therefore, allowing a trustee 
to wait over thirty days to announce the date and time for 
reconvening the creditors meeting defeats the policy supporting 
the bankruptcy system.123  Adhering to the thirty-day deadline 
leads to finality,124 which is important not only to debtors, “who 
need to get on with their lives, but also to trustees, who need to 
know which assets are theirs to administer.”125 
Similarly, the bankruptcy court in In re Friedlander 
articulated two policy considerations underlying the bankruptcy 
system which support the bright line approach.126  First, a bright 
line rule provides certainty to both debtors and creditors.127  The 
purpose of Rule 4003(b)’s thirty-day deadline is to allow both 
debtors and creditors to accurately assess their assets and move 
forward.128  In contrast, a reasonableness standard assessed on a 
case-by-case basis is unworkable in reality because it is nearly 
impossible to predict when a court will deem a delay 
unreasonable.129  Second, the court embraced the bright line rule 
to prevent undue delay.130  Just as Rule 4003(b) was enacted to 
prompt action, the “spirit of Rule 2003(e) is that a deadline for 
 
118 Id. at 882. 
119 Id. at 883. 
120 See id.  
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 Id. at 883 n.1. 
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exemptions be given in order to move the case along quickly.”131  
Therefore, any approach that allows for indefinite extensions of 
the creditors meeting fails to follow the spirit and purpose of the 
bankruptcy laws.132   
B. Case-by-Case 
A majority of courts have rejected a bright line approach, 
holding instead that indefinitely adjourned 341 creditors 
meetings are not necessarily concluded and therefore, do not 
trigger the thirty-day deadline.133  The case-by-case approach 
requires a determination in each case as to whether the trustee 
acted reasonably, based on the specific circumstances in choosing 
to generally continue the meeting instead of concluding it or 
adjourning to a specific time.  Courts using the case-by-case 
method rejected the bright line approach because such a strict 
rule could impede justice where a trustee needs more time and 
information to fully understand the debtor’s financial affairs.134   
For example, in In re Peres, the Fifth Circuit found that the  
case-by-case method afforded the trustee discretion yet 
restrained his ability to indefinitely postpone the next meeting of 
creditors.135  Under this approach trustee’s actions are analyzed 
under a reasonableness standard, which considers (1) the length 
of the delay; (2) the complexity of the estate; (3) the 
cooperativeness of the debtor; and (4) the existence of any 
ambiguity regarding whether the trustee continued or concluded 
the meeting.136   
 
131 Id. 
132 See id. 
133 See Peres v. Sherman (In re Peres), 530 F.3d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2008); see also 
Petit v. Fessenden (In re Petit), 182 B.R. 59, 63 (D. Me. 1995) (declining to adopt a 
bright line rule but instead looking to the reasonableness of delay); In re Bace, 364 
B.R. 166, 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding the case-by-case approach persuasive 
and refusing to impose a bright line rule without advance warning); In re James, 260 
B.R. 368, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2001) (finding that although a bright line rule would 
be preferable, the court must examine each case until the court adopted a local rule); 
In re Brown, 221 B.R. 902, 906 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (finding that a case-by-case 
method is best because “[t]rustees should have the discretion to perform their 
duties,” however some limitation on reasonableness should apply). 
134 In re Peres, 530 F.3d at 378. 
135 See id.  
136 Id.; see Steffen v. United States (In re Steffen), 405 B.R. 486 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
The indefinite continuation was deemed reasonable due to the complex nature of the 
case and the lack of ambiguity regarding the continuance. Id. at 492. The debtor’s 
lawyer did not object to the continuation, nor were the debtor’s financial affairs in 
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In Peres, the first 341 meeting of creditors was held on June 
20, 2005 and was subsequently adjourned three times.137  The 
third 341 meeting of creditors took place on September 23, 2005 
and was continued without an announcement of the next 
meeting’s date and time.138  The meeting was ultimately held and 
concluded on August 24, 2006, over eleven months after the last 
341 creditors meeting.139   
The court concluded that the eleven month adjournment was 
reasonable because of the debtor’s own complicity in the length of 
the delay.140  Specifically, the September 23rd meeting was 
continued because the debtor had not provided the requisite 
materials and was later continued again at the debtor’s 
request.141  Moreover, there was no ambiguity as to the 
continuance and thus little risk of harm to the debtor since he 
was the source of the delay.142 
Other courts have also applied the case-by-case analysis.  
For example, the bankruptcy court in In re Williams used the 
four factors from Peres to conclude that the ten month delay 
resulting from the trustee’s indefinite continuance was 
unreasonable and “violated the spirit” of Rule 4003(b).143  In 
examining whether the delay was justified, the court looked at 
the sequence of events to determine when the meeting concluded 
and when the thirty-day objection period began to run.  
Specifically, the court found that the reason for objecting resulted 
from the debtor’s errors, made early in the case, in claiming 
exemptions and providing documents.144  Moreover, these 
mistakes could have been easily discovered and resolved with the 
trustee’s reasonable diligence in the initial 341 meeting of 
 
order at the meeting. Id. at 493. Therefore, because the trustee acted reasonably 
under the circumstances, the meeting was not deemed “concluded” when the trustee 
continued the meeting indefinitely. Id. at 492. 
137 In re Peres, 530 F.3d at 376. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 378.  
141 Id. The court also found that the August 2006 meeting did not require 
advance written notice, despite the fact that a date of continuation was not set at the 
initial meeting, because “the [d]ebtors were not prejudiced by the lack of written 
notice.” Id. at 378–79. 
142 Id. at 378. 
143 See Logan v. Williams (In re Williams), 400 B.R. 479, 489–91 (Bankr. D. Md. 
2008). 
144 Id. at 489–90. 
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creditors.145  Accordingly, the court found that there was no 
reason why the trustee could not have filed an objection early in 
the case.146  The Williams Court also held that the case was not 
complex and the delay truly resulted from the trustee’s 
negligence in failing to recognize that the debtor had cited an 
incorrect statute for the exemption.147  The trustee, by writing 
only “Meeting of Creditors Held and Disposition Pending,” failed 
to continue, reschedule, or conclude the meeting, making it 
impossible to divine the status of the case.148  Ultimately, the 
court found that, because Rule 4003(b)’s time limits existed to 
speed the administration of cases and bring closure to both 
debtors and creditors, the trustee had acted unreasonably in 
failing to conclude or reschedule the meeting.149 
The Williams Court adopted a reasonableness rather than 
bright line approach based on its interpretation of Rule 
2003(e).150  The court found that in the context of Rule 2003(e), 
“may” is permissive; adjourning a meeting by announcing the 
date and time is not the exclusive means by which a meeting can 
be continued.151  Furthermore, Rule 2003(e) is completely silent 
as to a time frame for when a continued meeting needs to be 
rescheduled.152  The court, however, rejected senseless general 
continuances due to the ambiguity and confusion that results for 
both parties.153  As the Collier treatise stated  
The practice of keeping [2003(e)] meetings alive in [necessary] 
cases by successive continuances has been common and has 
much to commend it; it saves delay and expense in calling 
creditors together to consider special matters and often makes 
prompt action possible. 
However, meetings of creditors should not be routinely 
continued if no special circumstances warrant such action. . . .  
This practice plainly violates the intention of the Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure that there be a deadline for trustees 
 
145 Id.  
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 490. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 491.  
150 Id. at 488. 
151 Id. at 489 n.7. 
152 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e); see also In re Williams, 400 B.R. at 489 n.7 
(interpreting Rule 2003(e) to not require a continued meeting to be rescheduled 
within thirty days). 
153 In re Williams, 400 B.R. at 491. 
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and creditors to object to exemptions so that exemption issues 
can be settled expeditiously.  If a trustee needs further 
information in order to decide whether to object to an exemption, 
the trustee should either continue the section 341 meeting to a 
definite date or seek an extension of time to file objections to the 
exemption.154   
Therefore, the Williams Court, relying on the Collier 
treatise, concluded that even though a trustee “may” adjourn the 
meeting without announcing a date and time, when the propriety 
of a debtor’s exemption is in question, the better practice is for 
the trustee to file a motion with the bankruptcy court to extend 
the objection timeframe.155  Moreover, the motion for an extended 
objection period must be filed within thirty days of the conclusion 
of the 341 creditors meeting, as the obvious purpose of these time 
limits is to expedite case administration and provide closure for 
both debtors and creditors.156   
C. Debtor’s Burden 
The final approach imposes a burden on the debtor to ensure 
that the meeting of creditors concluded.  This line of cases holds 
that the 341 creditors meeting is not concluded until the trustee 
declares it to be concluded or the court so orders.157  On the one 
hand, these courts have rejected imposing a strict deadline for 
objecting because the Code and Rules do not provide one.158  On 
the other hand, this approach is skeptical of the case-by-case 
approach because relying on the trustee’s reasonableness is too 
uncertain.159   
For example, the bankruptcy court in In re DiGregorio found 
that because “the debtor has the greatest interest in concluding 
the meeting” and “trigger[ing] the 30-day objection 
period[,] . . . the debtor [bears the burden] to move for a court 
order concluding the § 341 [creditors] meeting.”160  The 
DiGregorio Court held that while Rule 2003(e) provides for 
 
154 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 41.02[5][g] (emphasis added). 
155 In re Williams, 400 B.R. at 491; FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e). 
156 In re Williams, 400 B.R. at 491 n.8. It is somewhat ironic that the court 
makes frequent reference to speedy administration of the case and emphasizes 
finality yet embraces a reasonable standard that is more likely to lead to delay. 
157 In re Koss, 319 B.R. 317, 321 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005). 
158 See In re Flynn, 200 B.R. 481, 484 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). 
159 Id. 
160 In re DiGregorio, 187 B.R. 273, 276 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995). 
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adjournment to future certain dates, there is no authority in 
either the Code or the Rules for the trustee to adjourn a 341 
creditors meeting generally.161  The court, however, conceded that 
in practice trustees do adjourn 341 meetings indefinitely and, in 
the absence of a statutorily defined conclusion date, the meeting 
can continue indefinitely, thereby preventing the commencement 
of the exemption objection period in 4003(b).162  Therefore, due to 
the Rules’ silence, the debtor must move to conclude the meeting, 
and courts will only act if the adjournment was found to be 
“arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”163 
More recently, the bankruptcy court in In re Koss noted the 
difference between a trustee’s duty to convene a meeting and his 
duty to conclude a meeting.164  The Koss Court held that Rule 
4003(b) was best interpreted as not limiting continuances, and 
accordingly, a 341 creditors meeting is not concluded until the 
trustee declares or the court orders.165  The court encouraged 
debtors who felt unduly and unnecessarily burdened by a lack of 
finality to file a motion to compel conclusion.166  Further, since 
Rule 2003(e) does not impose a per se deadline for the conclusion 
of a 341 creditors meeting or a deadline for reconvening an 
adjourned meeting, the court declined to authorize or craft one.167   
III. ANALYSIS OF RULE 4003(B) 
Read together, the Code and Rules, create a system where 
debtors, within a short timeframe, can attain finality about their 
retained assets and predict their finances more accurately 
moving forward.  Construing Rule 2003(e) liberally and 
preventing the Rule 4003(b) deadline from running means that a 
debtor might never have the certainty of knowing whether she 
may keep the property listed as exempt until the trustee decides 
to object.  Such a construction suggests that when a chapter 7 




163 Id. (quoting In re Vance, 120 B.R. 181, 196 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1990)); see also 
In re Flynn, 200 B.R. at 484 (quoting In re DiGregorio, 187 B.R. at 276) (finding that 
trustees may continue creditors meetings indefinitely and prevent commencement of 
the exemption objection period). 




CP_McLoughlin (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:13 PM 
2010] TICK TOCK 1527 
grant a discharge, individual debtors will remain clueless about 
whether their home, car, clothes, tools of trade, and so on will be 
objected to by the trustee.  Allowing the trustee to dodge the Rule 
4003(b) thirty-day deadline is logically inconsistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code’s detailed framework promoting a speedy 
resolution in an individual’s case.168  
A. Exemption Policy: Striking a Balance 
Strictly construing the Code and the Rules effectuates 
congressional intent because the carefully drafted text reflects 
both the policy and the goals underlying the mandate.169  The 
Code contains the numerous, and often conflicting, objectives of 
the consumer bankruptcy system: (1) equitably distributing 
assets among creditors; (2) expeditiously and efficiently resolving 
cases; (3) giving the individual debtor a fresh start; and 
(4) providing both debtors and creditors with a sense of finality.170  
Section 522 of the Code aims to strike a balance between these 
competing values—namely the tension between maximizing 
exemptions for the debtor’s benefit and maximizing the estate for 
creditors’ recovery.  Though the policies of asset distribution and 
the fresh start are at odds, all parties desire a prompt and 
effective administration of the debtor’s estate.171  Because Rule 
 
168 See Lini, Inc. v. Schachter (In re Schachter), 214 B.R. 767, 777 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1997) (describing an artificial extension of the first meeting as a mechanism for 
extending the Rule 4003(b) bar date as inconsistent with “the spirit if not the letter 
of Taylor”); Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 407 (“When employed purely to extend 
artificially the exemption objection period, the tactic of indefinitely continuing the 
first creditors meeting is a misuse of the process that ought not be tolerated.”). 
169 See Stoulig v. Traina, 169 B.R. 597, 601 (E.D. La. 1994) (“The bankruptcy 
rules should be interpreted to effectuate the mandate Congress announced.”); In re 
Florida, 268 B.R. 875, 880 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (“When faced with a proper claim 
of exemption, courts strictly construe § 522(l) and Rule 4003(b).”); Carlos J. Cuevas, 
The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory Construction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435, 455 (1994). See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of 
the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 71 
WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993). Policy arguments are developed in the lower courts, so by 
the time the cases reach the Supreme Court, policy justifications exist for both sides. 
Id. at 538. The Court then picks the result, with its policy justifications that best 
support the statutory text. Id.  
170 See Keith Sharfman, Derivative Suits in Bankruptcy, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 1, 16 (2004). 
171 Superintendent of Ins. for the State of N.Y. v. Ochs (In re First Fin. Corp.), 
377 F.3d 209, 216 (2d Cir. 2004); Beaty v. Selinger (In re Beaty), 306 F.3d 914, 922 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
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4003(b) is derived from and supports the substance of § 522,172 it 
too must ensure that an equitable balance between debtor and 
creditor is met.   
1. Fresh Start 
The fresh start policy is a bedrock principle of consumer 
bankruptcy law, and retaining exempt property facilitates the 
debtor’s transition into post-bankruptcy life.173  It is axiomatic 
that a primary purpose of the Code’s exemption provisions is to 
foster the fresh start by permitting a debtor to retain enough 
assets to stay afloat post-bankruptcy.174  Two guiding rationales 
underlie the exemption process: “(1) to give the debtors a so-
called ‘grub stake’ to begin their fresh start and (2) to act as a 
safety net, so that the debtor . . . [is] not [left] completely 
impoverished” by the collection process.175  Exempt assets aid in a 
debtor’s reentry into society as a productive member and prevent 
the debtor from becoming destitute and a public charge.176  
Although a central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide 
a means “by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their 
affairs, [and] make peace with their creditors,” the Code limits 
this “opportunity for . . . ‘the honest but unfortunate debtor.’ ”177  
Due to the fresh start’s elevated status in consumer bankruptcy 
laws, any practice that hinders exemption entitlements must be 
narrowly construed.178  
 
172 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003. 
173 See Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 398 (“[T]he fresh start policy 
objective . . . animates the consumer bankruptcy system.”). 
174 See Sheehan v. Morehead (In re Morehead), 283 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1995); S & C 
Home Loans, Inc. v. Farr (In re Farr), 278 B.R. 171, 175 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002); 
Funches v. Household Fin. Consumer Disc. Co. (In re Funches), 381 B.R. 471, 491 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008); In re Remington, 311 B.R. 315, 317 (Bankr. D. Me. 2004). 
175 See In re Robinson, 292 B.R. 599, 606 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003) (quoting In re 
Sumerell, 194 B.R. 818, 826 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996)). 
176 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 115 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6087 (“The historical purpose of these exemption laws has been to protect a debtor 
from his creditors, to provide him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his 
creditors levy on all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute 
and a public charge.”). 
177 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991) (citations omitted); see also 
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“The principal 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but 
unfortunate debtor.’ ” (quoting Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87)). 
178 See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998). 
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An indefinite or unannounced adjournment can be equated 
with delay and instability, two concepts patently in conflict with 
the fresh start.  Artificially extending the objection period by 
indefinitely continuing the § 341 meeting is a misuse of the 
bankruptcy process.179  One commentator, Lawrence Ponoroff, 
names three factors that point toward restraining the ability of 
the trustee to avoid Rule 4003(b)’s time limitation by continuing 
the creditors meeting generally.180  First, the trustee has special 
responsibilities to the court and to the bankruptcy system to  
act within the letter and spirit of the statute.181  These 
responsibilities include examining, investigating, and valuing the 
debtor’s assets to facilitate a fresh start in a timely fashion.182  
Second, the Code provides several other remedies to discourage 
and penalize a debtor who attempts to claim improper 
exemptions.183  Finally, although the debtor can move to conclude 
the 341 meeting of creditors, there is a fundamental inequality of 
available resources, namely knowledge and money, favoring the 
trustee.184  Therefore, it is appropriate to utilize the strict 
interpretation of Rule 4003(b) adopted in Taylor to focus on a 
debtor’s fresh start rather than on improper incentives or abuses 
of process.185 
2. Efficient Resolution of Cases and Finality  
Economy of administration, another fundamental purpose of 
bankruptcy law, has been accorded equal status with the  
dual goals of equitable distribution and the fresh start.186  Delay, 
along with its inevitable counterpart of uncertainty,  
undermines a debtor’s expectations of a financial fresh start and 
impairs creditors’ expectations of prompt determination of 
distributions.187  Dragging out cases “works to the detriment of 
creditors[,] . . . who often prefer to get paid less money with 
 
179 See Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 407. 
180 Id. at 408. 
181 Id. 
182 TRUSTEE HANDBOOK, supra note 49, ¶ 6(A), 6(B)(1). 
183 Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 408; see infra Part III.B. 
184 Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 408. 
185 Id. 
186 Superintendent of Ins. for the State of N.Y. v. Ochs (In re First Cent. Fin. 
Corp.), 377 F.3d 209, 214 (2d Cir. 2004); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 advisory 
committee’s note; S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong. (1970); 93 CONG. REC. 75 (1973).  
187 See Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 399. 
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certainty sooner rather than possibly a larger sum later.”188  As 
delay ensues, hopes for distribution decrease, and unpaid 
creditors are forced to pass on the costs to the consuming 
public.189  These creditor losses result in higher interest rates and 
lower credit availability to society.190  Unfortunately, these 
adverse effects of stalled exemptions on credit markets are 
typically borne by the poor, who cannot afford the increased cost 
of acquiring credit.191  Therefore, bankruptcy law must balance 
“the creditor’s desire to be paid, the debtor’s desire to escape a 
burdensome situation, the value society places on having people 
pay their debts in full, and the value society places on allowing 
debtors to start anew.”192  Thus, Rule 4003(b)’s thirty-day 
deadline reflects an attempt to strike a proper balance between 
providing trustees and creditors with an opportunity to object to 
any potentially unlawful exemptions, while simultaneously 
assuring the debtor of some sense of finality.193 
One of Congress’s objectives in enacting the Code was to 
encourage a speedy resolution of cases, thereby reducing delay.194  
This stated goal is jeopardized by the practice of indefinite 
continuances, which promotes uncertainty and ambiguity 
regarding assets.  In contrast, the thirty-day time period in Rule 
4003(b) advances the general purpose of the Code, which is to 
 
188 Sharfman, supra note 170, at 21. 
189 See Douglas E. Deutsch, Note, Exemption Reform: Examining the Proposals, 
3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 207, 213 (1995). 
190 Id.; see also Samuel J. M. Donnelly, The New (Proposed?) Bankruptcy Act: 
The Development of Its Structural Provisions and Their Impact on the Interests of 
Consumer-Debtors, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 291, 320 (1978) (concluding that a 
creditor’s benefit, by surviving bankruptcy or being paid as much as possible, is 
often society’s gain); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1427 (1985) (noting that decreasing costs of discharges 
threaten to decrease availability of credit and increase costs to borrowers); Judith 
Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of 
the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22, 32–33 (1983) 
(suggesting that liberal exemption grants by legislatures may lead to reduced 
availability of goods and services on credit).  
191 Richard M. Hynes et al., The Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws, 
47 J.L. & ECON. 19, 20 (2004). 
192 Deutsch, supra note 189 (quoting Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, 
Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 
131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 125 (1982)). 
193 See Stoulig v. Traina, 169 B.R. 597, 599 (E.D. La. 1994).   
194 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Sen. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 490 (1977). 
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“quickly and effectively . . . settle bankrupt estates.”195  Ignoring 
this clear limitation by allowing indefinite delay means “debtors 
would remain suspended in limbo awaiting action by the trustee 
or creditors to file objections to the debtor’s claim for 
exemptions.”196  This result, created by trustees attempting to 
circumvent the thirty-day deadline, defies the fundamental 
principle that bankruptcy laws in general, and Rule 4003(b) in 
particular, were created to efficiently administer debtors’ 
estates.197   
Similarly, the goal of finality is vitally important in securing 
both a fresh start and speedy resolution to the debtor’s case.198  In 
the exemption process, finality promotes efficiency by 
encouraging strict adherence to time-tables for addressing 
exemptions and mandating that the issue cannot be reviewed 
after the thirty-day deadline has passed.  Both debtors and 
creditors structure financial decisions in accordance with Code 
provisions,199 and any approach carving out an exception to the 
text creates uncertainty and chaos.  Interpretational variations 
regarding a meeting’s conclusion, seen in the three approaches 
above, have promoted this uncertainty and unpredictability.  The 
uncertainty has led to wasteful litigation, which prevents 
finality, the fresh start, and any reasonable expectation of a 
speedy resolution.200   
B. Plain Meaning and a Holistic Reading of Rule 4003(b) and 
Its Counterparts 
When interpreting and applying the Code and the Rules, 
analysis necessarily begins with the text.201  The Supreme Court 
 
195 Stoulig, 169 B.R. at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re 
Robintech, Inc., 863 F.2d 393, 397–98 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
196 Id. at 601. 
197 Id. 
198 Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2365–66 (2009). 
199 See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 341.02[5][g]. 
200 Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 399. 
201 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“The starting point . . . is the 
existing statutory text.”); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 
(1989) (“[W]here . . . the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is 
to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 
470, 485 (1917))); Gregory E. Maggs, Estoppel and Textualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 
167, 171 (2006). Textualism is based on: (1) legislative supremacy and (2) the fact 
that legislatures speak only through enacted legislation. Id. Therefore, the words of 
the statute are to be the primary basis for determining the statute’s meaning. Id. 
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has primarily used strict statutory construction in its bankruptcy 
decisions.202  The Bankruptcy Code and Rules necessitate a 
narrow, plain meaning reading because of the substantive and 
fundamental property rights at stake, which should only be 
disturbed on the most irrefutable of grounds: the unequivocal 
meaning of the language in the statute.203  Exemptions are vital 
to the paramount bankruptcy concept of a “fresh start,”204 and 
limitations that impair the fresh start should be tightly 
construed.205   
Courts should first attempt to use the plain meaning 
approach, which analyzes only the text of the statute, in an effort 
to enforce its literal meaning.206  On the other hand, if a 
particular provision is ambiguous or if there is no specific 
provision to govern a particular issue, such as the action required 
for “concluding” a creditors meeting, then the courts should 
engage in holistic statutory interpretation.207  This process 
 
Textualists consult canons of construction, dictionaries, and other parts of the 
legislation in more difficult cases. Id. 
202 See Cuevas, supra note 169, at 438–40 (1994); see also Peter H. Carroll, III, 
Literalism: The United States Supreme Court’s Methodology for Statutory 
Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143, 144–46 (1993); Thomas 
G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10 
BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 290 (1994). Strictly construing a statute means that application 
of the statute is limited to the cases to which the language clearly applies. Id. at 322. 
Strict construction is analogous to plain meaning. Id. at 323. In contrast, “liberally” 
construing a statute requires an interpretation affording broad and inclusive 
application to remedy the broadest set of evils. Id. at 322–23. 
203 See Kelch, supra note 202, at 325. The article goes on to say that bankruptcy 
law has many characteristics of laws that are strictly construed, such as vested 
property rights, debtor-creditor relations, a legislative history full of compromises, 
as well as intense interest group pressure. Id. at 323. Furthermore, because the 
Code affects fundamental rights in and to property, it should be treated differently 
from other remedial statutes that are typically liberally construed. Id. at 325. 
Because bankruptcy law substantively affects the property rights of both debtors 
and creditors, it is fitting that the Code be interpreted as dislodging those rights 
only when the statute unequivocally states so. Id. 
204 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“The principal 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant the debtor a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest 
but unfortunate debtor.’ ” (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991))); 
Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 325 (2005) (“To help the debtor obtain a fresh 
start, the Bankruptcy Code permits him to withdraw from the estate certain 
interests in property, such as his car or home, up to certain values.”).  
205 See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (referring to the “ ‘well-
known’ guide that exceptions to discharge ‘should be confined to those plainly 
expressed’ ” (citations omitted)). 
206 Cuevas, supra note 169, at 438. 
207 Id.  
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promotes predictability,208 and it prevents bankruptcy judges 
from using their equitable powers to create substantive 
entitlements that are not specifically authorized by the Code.209 
The holistic approach focuses on the Rules promulgated by 
the Court and enacted by Congress and views them in light of the 
structure of the Code as a whole, seeking a determination that is 
compatible with the entire statutory scheme.210  When engaging 
in a holistic endeavor of statutory construction, the relevant 
provisions of the Code and Rules must be construed together and 
harmonized to divine a congressional intent that effectuates the 
purpose of the legislative enactment.211  Statutes should be read 
as giving effect to each word, clause, and sentence, and if the 
provision is susceptible to various meanings, the construction 
adopted should advance the overall statutory policy.212  Thus, 
ascertaining the congressional intent for when a 341 meeting 
concludes requires a natural reading of § 522 and the relevant 
Rules and selecting an interpretation that is consistent with the 
entire statutory scheme. 
Rule 4003(b), working in tandem with § 522(l), governs the 
procedures for claiming and objecting to exemptions.  The Rule 
sets a deadline for objections to prevent an open-ended 
continuation of the meeting and to discourage parties from 
sleeping on their rights and then swooping in months or years 
 
208 See also Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Evolving “Plain Meaning” Approach to Bankruptcy Juriprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1636, 1639 (1993). A plain meaning approach to interpretation is the best route 
for certainty and predictability when structuring commercial transactions. Kelch, 
supra note 202, at 329. Plain meaning interpretation is said to be better than a 
policy-based analysis because it provides the greatest degree of accuracy and clarity. 
Id. 
209 Cuevas, supra note 169, at 439. 
210 Id.; see also United Saving Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1998). The Court based its decision on its interpretation 
of different Code sections because no particular Code provision addressed the issue. 
Id. 
211 See Carroll, supra note 202, at 151–52. The article espouses the Supreme 
Court’s “new literalism” tactic employed in Ron Pair, which emphasizes a statute’s 
“intrinsic construction” through a rigorous examination of statutory text, structure, 
composition, and relationship to other statutes. Id. at 151. The analysis requires 
consideration of the grammatical structure of the statute, the use of particular 
words in the same statute, and the language as part of a comprehensive statutory 
scheme. Id. 
212 Id. at 151–52. 
CP_McLoughlin (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:13 PM 
1534 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1505   
later to protest the debtor’s exemption.213  By writing a deadline, 
and a short one at that, the Rule indicates an attempt to bring an 
end to the objection process in order to move the ultimate 
discharge process forward.214   
Significantly, Rule 2003(e) provides the trustee with 
virtually unlimited control over the objection process.  The Rule 
provides that “[t]he meeting may be adjourned from time to time 
by announcement at the meeting of the adjourned date and time 
without further written notice.”215  A natural reading of the Rule 
indicates that the trustee has discretion to adjourn the meeting 
but that the trustee lacks discretion regarding the announcement 
of a specific future date and time at the meeting.216  Though the 
statute’s language is plain, and thus, must be enforced according 
to its terms,217 courts have interpreted the language of the Rule 
permissively, finding that the trustee “may,” but is not required 
to, announce a future date and time at the meeting.  This liberal 
construction gives the trustee unfettered discretion to adjourn 
the meeting and leaves the debtor guessing as to when and if it 
will be reconvened.  This construction also impedes the cohesive 
and fast-paced framework designed to resolve individual debtors’ 
cases within a short timeframe.  When viewed in light of the 
statutory scheme providing for case resolution within 124 days, 
an interpretation allowing an indefinite continuance in order to 





213 See In re Peterman, 358 B.R. 801, 804 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) (following the 
expiration of the thirty-day deadline, the debtor can treat exempted property as his 
own and is not forced to wait until some unknown future date, when the trustee 
might haul the debtor into court seeking that property). 
214 Id. 
215 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(e) (emphasis added).  
216 In addition, the trustee has the option of requesting an extension of the 
thirty-day period if the request is made within the original thirty-day period. Id. 
4003(b)(1). 
217 See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 
6 (2000).   
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C. Equitable Considerations, Strict Statutory Construction, and 
§ 105 
Section 105(a) gives the bankruptcy court broad equitable 
powers to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”218  It further states:  
No provision of the [the Bankruptcy Code] providing for the 
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to 
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or 
making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce 
or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of 
process.219 
Despite its seemingly boundless language, § 105 may only be 
used in furtherance of other sections of the Code and cannot be 
used to expand judicial power or conflict with other statutes.220  
Accordingly, § 105 does not provide for open-ended adjournments 
in derogation of the policy of finality underlying the Code.  
Moreover, although bankruptcy courts have been called courts of 
equity,221 § 105 is “not a roving commission to do equity.”222  
Therefore, courts cannot create remedies or override provisions 
in derogation of the stated limits present in the Code and 
Rules.223 
For example, in Coie v. Sadkin (In re Sadkin), where a 
creditor missed the explicit thirty-day deadline and belatedly 
filed an objection, using § 105 to sustain the objection was held to 
be inconsistent with the operation of § 522(l), Rule 4003(b), and 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of these provisions.224  The 
 
218 See Nicholas B. Malito, Recent Developments: Section 105(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 363, 363 (2009) 
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006)).  
219 11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West 2011); see also Malito, supra note 218. 
220 See id.  
221 See Edith H. Jones, The Bankruptcy Galaxy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 269, 270–71 
(1999) (“Approaching bankruptcy from the standpoint of a law court instead of an 
equity court may, in my view, lead to a more even balance between debtors’ and 
creditors’ rights.”). 
222 Ameriquest Mortg. Co. v. Nosek (In re Nosek), 544 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2008); 
see also Jones, supra note 221. 
223 See Scrivner v. Mashburn (In re Scrivner), 535 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir. 
2008); Mazon v. Tardif, 395 B.R. 742, 749 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that § 105(a) 
may not be used in a manner inconsistent with other, more specific provisions of the 
Code and that a bankruptcy court may not read additional exceptions or remedies 
into the statutory provisions of the Code); Malito, supra note 218, at 365. 
224 36 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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reasoning was that § 105 does not empower the court to override 
explicit mandates of other Code sections.225  Realistically, the 
potential prejudice to creditors is remedied by the Code and 
Rules’ various provisions discouraging debtors from making 
claims lacking merit.226 
Additionally, strict statutory construction limits a 
bankruptcy court’s ability to utilize equitable considerations to 
evade the clear language in the statute.227  If a court were 
empowered to use equity to disregard the text of statutes, then 
carefully-crafted legislation would be meaningless and the “rule 
of law would be eviscerated.”228  If a court were allowed to 
consider the relative equities of a decision, such as the 
reasonableness of the trustee or the complexity of a case, it would 
produce havoc and decrease predictability.229  Because the court’s 
decision would not be based upon the plain meaning of the text, 
parties could not plan their transactions with certainty because 
the outcome might vary depending on the particular judge’s 
sense of fairness.230  Strict statutory construction constrains a 
court’s equitable powers by favoring the certainty and 
predictability embodied within the dictates of the Code.231  Thus, 
the correct interpretation of Rule 4003(b) focuses on the 
principles of finality, expeditious administration, and a fresh 
start, rather than on equitable considerations of prejudice to 
creditors from narrowly construed deadlines.232 
IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT WITH A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A. Revision Requiring Action 
A law that effectively implements the policies animating the 
Code and Rules must strike a balance between the perennial 
conflict surrounding debtors and creditors.  Therefore, resolving 
ambiguity in the “conclusion” of a meeting must accommodate 
 
225 Id. at 478. 
226 See infra Part III.B. 
227 See Cuevas, supra note 169, at 466. 
228 Id. 
229 See id. at 467. 
230 See id. 
231 See id.  
232 See Ponoroff, supra note 75, at 410–11; see also Effross, supra note 208 
(explaining that the literal reading of the Code increases predictability in 
bankruptcy decisions and decreases the volume of litigation). 
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the debtor’s need for a fresh start, the creditors’ right to equitable 
distribution, and the shared goals of expeditious and efficient 
administration of the estate.  This Note advocates that Rule 
4003(b) be revised to require that unless the trustee, “for cause,” 
announces the future date and time of the adjourned meeting at 
the 341 meeting of creditors, the thirty-day period begins as of 
the last date of the 341 meeting. 
This approach fosters the fresh start, promotes speedy 
resolution, creates certainty, and advances a sense of finality, yet 
provides the trustee and creditors with the opportunity to object 
at the meeting based on the particular circumstances.  The 
flexible “for cause” requirement considers the motives and 
strategies of all the parties by allowing an adjournment for a 
legitimate reason, yet proscribes adjournment tactics that result 
in unnecessary delay.  The “for cause” requirement thus prohibits 
the trustee from extending the duration of the case for no reason 
but also allows for objections when the debtor has not acted 
appropriately or legitimate concerns remain about the debtor’s 
finances.   
Requiring “cause” for adjourning the 341 meeting is 
consistent with current Rule 4003(b), which requires a party to 
show cause on a motion for an extension of time after the 
meeting has concluded.  Rule 4003(b) states:  “The court may, for 
cause, extend the time for filing objections if, before the time to 
object expires, a party in interest files a request for an 
extension.”233  The cause requirement was specifically added to 
Rule 4003(b) in the 2000 amendments but was not defined by the 
Rules.234  The “for cause” requirement found in Rules 4004(b) and 
4007(c) has not been interpreted as “just because I ask,” but 
rather as a showing of good reason why an extension should be 
granted.235  Since there is no explicit definition of “cause” 
anywhere in the Code or Rules, the determination is left to 
judicial interpretation.236   
 
 
233 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) (emphasis added). 
234 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003 advisory committee’s note; see also In re Booth, 
259 B.R. 413, 415 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001). 
235 See In re Garner, 339 B.R. 610, 611 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
236 See In re Stonham, 317 B.R. 544, 547 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2004). 
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What constitutes “cause” is fact specific, taking into 
consideration the circumstances of each case but also placing 
restraints on the trustee’s actions.237  Many courts have 
interpreted “cause” to mean that the trustee or creditor must 
demonstrate a reasonable degree of due diligence to receive the 
requested extension of time.238  Several factors that aid in the 
determination of showing cause include (1) whether the debtor 
refused in bad faith to cooperate with the creditor; (2) whether 
the creditor has sufficient notice of the deadline and the 
information to file an objection; (3) the possibility that the 
proceedings pending in another forum will result in collateral 
estoppel on the relevant issues; (4) whether the creditor exercised 
diligence; and (5) the complexity of the case.239 
For example, in In re Booth, when the debtor converted her 
case from chapter 13 to chapter 7, “cause” for an extension 
existed in order to give the trustee the opportunity to review and 
object to the claimed  exemptions.240  “Cause” also existed when 
the debtor failed to respond to formal discovery requests, but the 
court did not grant more time when a debtor failed to respond to 
informal requests.241  Additionally, “cause” could be shown by 
simply noting the claim’s failure to establish the debtor’s 
entitlement to the exemption sought or the claim’s failure to 
identify the property claimed.242  Though there is no precise 
definition of what constitutes “cause,” reasonable concern 
regarding the legitimacy of claimed exemptions, made at the 341 
meeting of creditors or in the thirty days following, would 
probably suffice for an extension of time. 
 
237 See id. at 547–48; In re Molitor, 395 B.R. 197, 205 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008). 
238 See In re Stonham, 317 B.R. at 547 (finding that if “cause” must be shown, 
“then the Court does not agree that the movant’s burden of proof can be satisfied 
with only a scintilla of evidence”). 
239 See In re Ballas, 342 B.R. 853, 856 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005). 
240 See In re Booth, 259 B.R. 413, 416 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that 
“cause” for extending deadline for objecting to exemptions existed when debtor 
converted from one chapter to another in order to give trustee time to review 
exemptions and to prevent potential abuse). 
241 See In re Carlson, 380 B.R. 906, 908 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that 
informal discovery requests made in June 2007, without further filing formal 
requests, were not legally sufficient showings of “cause” for granting further 
extensions of deadlines in January 2008). 
242 See Moldo v. Clark (In re Clark), 266 B.R. 163, 171 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that the trustee should have made a “for cause” motion based on the debtor’s 
withholding of information and thereby saved much time and uncertainty for all 
parties). 
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This proposed revision prohibits the trustee from dodging 
the thirty-day deadline and undermining the framework and 
policies underlying consumer bankruptcies.  The bright line, 
case-by-case, and debtor’s burden approaches have all proved 
unworkable and, instead of quickly resolving cases, have made 
the process slower and more protracted.  Logically, Rule 4003(b) 
was promulgated to provide a deadline because the Court and 
Congress expected that deadline to begin running early in the 
case.  Allowing the trustee additional time in the absence of 
special circumstances contravenes the values reflected in the 
Code and thwarts both debtors’ and creditors’ expectations of a 
prompt resolution.   
The Code and the Rules have intentionally adopted a 
framework in which individual chapter 7 cases are almost always 
concluded within four months.243  Within that timeframe, 
individual debtors should acquire some clarity and security 
regarding their finances on a going-forward basis.  Early on in 
the case, a debtor makes substantial disclosures about his or her 
finances and is questioned by the trustee at the creditors meeting 
and therefore, deserves to be on notice of any objections to the 
listed exemptions.  The approaches adopted above, particularly 
the case-by-case and debtor’s burden, suggest that a debtor’s 
finances, future prospects, and ability to use property claimed as 
exempt must remain in limbo while the trustee decides whether 
and when to reconvene the meeting.  As a practical concern, as 
time progresses, debtors will not have even been put on notice 
about whether their car, home, furnishings, clothes, tools of the 
trade, and other items will later be turned over to the trustee.  
By requiring the trustee to announce a definite future meeting 
date at the current meeting or risk losing the authority to, 
debtors can begin to reasonably restructure their affairs with 
some certainty as to what they still own.  The Code and Rules act 
together to set forth a framework pushing chapter 7 cases to 
conclusion in four months and require that objections be filed  
 
 
243 See Discharge in Bankruptcy, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts. 
gov/bankruptcycourts/bankruptcybasics/discharge.html#when (last visited Feb. 11, 
2011) (stating on the Federal Judiciary’s “Bankruptcy Basics” that “typically, [a 
chapter 7 discharge is granted] about four months after the date the debtor files the 
petition”). See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West 2011); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 
4003(a). 
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within just thirty days of the last 341 creditors meeting.  
Permitting trustee’s unfettered discretion to prevent this 
deadline from ever beginning is irrational.  
B. The Code Provides Numerous Other Remedies for Protection 
of Creditors 
Tension exists between the debtor’s interest in a fresh start 
and the trustee’s duties to catch abusive exemptions in a limited 
time frame.  Critics of Taylor and the bright line approach 
suggest that an open ended construction of Rules 4003(b) and 
2003(e) is necessary to prevent abusive debtors who list 
erroneous exemptions in the hopes that the trustee will not 
notice in time.244  This proposed solution, however, clarifies the 
intended thrust of the Rules:  “If a trustee needs further 
information in order to decide whether to object to an exemption, 
the trustee should either continue the section 341 meeting to a 
definite date or seek an extension of time to file objections to the 
exemption.”245  Under this approach, if the trustee does not catch 
an improper exemption at the 341 meeting, he or she still has 
thirty days to move for an extension of time to investigate.246 
In 2008, Rule 4003(b) was amended to create an exception to 
the thirty-day deadline in cases where a debtor fraudulently 
claimed an exemption.247  The Rule provides:  “The trustee may 
file an objection to a claim of exemption at any time prior to one 
year after the closing of the case if the debtor fraudulently 
asserted the claim of exemption.”248  The Advisory Committee 
Notes demonstrates that the revised Rule was designed to 
resolve the very situation with which critics are concerned:  
“Extending the deadline for trustees to object to an exemption 
when the exemption claim has been fraudulently made will 
permit the court to review and, in proper circumstances, deny 
improperly claimed exemptions, thereby protecting the legitimate 
interests of creditors and the bankruptcy estate.”249   
 
244 See, e.g., Peres v. Sherman (In re Peres), 530 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008). 
245 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 1, ¶ 341.02[5][g]. 
246 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b). 
247 Id. 4003(b)(2). 
248 Id.  
249 FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003 advisory committee’s note. 
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Notably, in 2009, only thirteen individual debtors out of the 
1.4 million who filed were convicted of bankruptcy fraud.250  To 
the very limited extent exemption fraud exists, this added 
safeguard assuages the critics’ fear of debtor fraud.251 
The possibility of debtors making groundless exemption 
claims with impunity is an insufficient reason to render the 
deadline for objections meaningless in light of the numerous 
Code provisions discouraging abuse.  Section 727, the discharge 
statute for chapter 7 bankruptcies, contains a number of 
provisions authorizing denial of discharge for fraud or abuse of 
the system.  Overall, pursuant to § 727, if the debtor knowingly 
or fraudulently hindered, delayed, falsified, or concealed with 
respect to any property or process of the administration, he or 
she will be denied discharge.252  In addition, § 152 of Title 18 
imposes criminal penalties for concealing assets and making 
false oaths and claims.253 
In addition to the Code, the Rules also serve to limit bad 
faith claims of exemptions by debtors.  Rule 9011 authorizes 
sanctions for signing certain documents not “well grounded in 
fact” and “warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”254  
Similarly, Rule 1008 requires all filings to be “verified or contain 
an unsworn declaration” of truthfulness under penalty of 
perjury.255  These significant provisions help ensure that 
adequate and accurate information is provided in all filings made 
in chapter 7 consumer cases. 
 
 
250 See Bankruptcy Fraud—Criminal Investigation (CI), IRS, http://www.irs. 
gov/compliance/enforcement/article/0,,id=117520,00.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2011); 
Statistical Data—Bankruptcy Fraud, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/ 
enforcement/article/0,,id=118207,00.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
251 Realistically, this exception may be of little use to creditors. 9 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47, ¶ 4003.03[1][b]. “Once a case is closed, a trustee is not 
likely to spend further time considering the debtor’s assets.” Id. This is especially so 
considering that “the trustee is discharged before the case is closed and would have 
to seek reappointment.” Id. 
252 See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2006). 
253 See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). 
254 11 U.S.C.A. § 707 (West 2011). 
255 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1008. 
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CONCLUSION 
The solution proposed in this Note—which requires 
announcement of the date and time of a future meeting at the 
current meeting—fosters the expeditious, efficient, and 
responsible administration of a chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy 
case.  The proposal harmonizes the competing desires of debtors 
and creditors by providing a means to resolve disputes early on 
so both parties can move forward.  By requiring the trustee to 
declare a new meeting or risk losing the authority to do so,  
this proposal accords with the comprehensive statutory design 
mandated by the Code and Rules.  Any practice that 
unnecessarily extends the objection period contravenes the fresh 
start policy embedded in the Code’s exemption provisions and 
denies the honest, but unfortunate, debtor a chance for financial 
rebirth. 
 
 
